



Abstract: At the core of ethics in professions is the ability to 
cope with conflict of interest situations. The professional has 
a primary duty to look after the interest of the client, and 
a secondary duty to serve his or her personal interests. The 
client is normally not in a position to evaluate the quality 
of the service on offer. Due to the knowledge gap, a lawyer, 
accountant, consultant, doctor, or teacher can be in a position 
to give priority to self-interest over the interest of the person 
who receives the services, without detection. Some professions 
operate with more or less explicit pledges to the clients not to 
do exploit their advantage in knowledge: “Trust me; although 
my own self-interest might dictate other actions, I undertake 
to serve in your best interest.” A conflict of interest situation 
is different from a real moral dilemma in that it does not 
constitute a choice between moral values that are on more or 
less the same equal footing, but are instead false dilemmas, 
in the sense of being temptations to choose the morally wrong 
option at the expense of the morally right one.
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When the international partners of one of the world’s leading consul-
tancy firms met for a seminar some years ago, a facilitator asked them 
to consider the following situation: Their company has agreed to do a 
project for a client for the price of 1,000,000 Euro, based on an hourly 
price and an estimated use of working hours. As the project comes to a 
close, the project manager can see that the hourly price multiplied with 
the actual number of working hours will give a total price of 700,000 
Euro. Due to some wise decisions and clever thinking underway, the 
company will deliver a quality project with lower input in terms of work-
ing hours. The project manager is uncertain about how this should affect 
the invoice she sends to the client. She considers three options:
Send an invoice for the agreed 1,000,000 Euro.A 
Send an invoice for 700,000 Euro.B 
Add extra work useful for the client, so the working hours add up C 
to 1,000,000 Euro, and send an invoice for that amount.
When the consulting firm partners heard this story, they stood in the 
middle of a room, with no furniture. They were told to think individu-
ally about the decision for a brief moment, and then decide to move to 
one of three corners of the room, each representing the three options the 
project manager faced. The outcome was that all three options received 
considerable support, as the partners placed themselves evenly in the 
three available corners.
The participants in this exercise had to make a decision without full 
information about the situation, and the differences in their behaviour 
may be due to variations in how they interpreted it. It is unclear what 
sort of contract the company had with the client, whether it was a fixed 
price contract or one where the price would be calculated retrospectively, 
when the actual number of hours was known. Those who moved to the 
A corner may have interpreted the situation to be of the former kind, 
while those who moved to corners B and C may have interpreted it to 
be of the latter kind. In the ensuing discussion, it became clear that the 
company could face situations of this nature, where there was ambiguity 
in the contract and in the expectations from the client. There was also 
disagreement about how openly they would and should share infor-
mation about working hours with the client. What should the project 
manager say to the client if she sent a 1,000,000 Euro invoice and the 
client later inquired about the number of working hours? One partner 
claimed that this provided an opportunity to demonstrate client loyalty. 
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A combination of transparency and an invoice for the lowest sum could 
generate more work for the same client at a later stage. In terms from 
the Navigation Wheel, it made good economic and reputational sense to 
share information with the client and invoice for 700,000 Euro.
The project manager in the example faces a conflict of interest situ-
ation, where she must choose between prioritizing the client’s interest 
or her company’s interest. As a provider of professional services, the 
company has a primary duty to look after the client’s interest, and a 
secondary duty to serve its own interest. Typically, the client will not 
have the knowledge or insight necessary to judge whether his or her 
interest is at the forefront when the provider performs its services. It is 
difficult for a non-professional to determine whether an accountant, a 
lawyer, a teacher, a doctor, or a financial advisor delivers work of the 
required quality, and puts client interest first. Due to the knowledge gap, 
the professional can often give priority to his or her own interest, without 
much fear of detection.
Nanda (2002ii) places conflict of interest at the core of ethics in profes-
sions, and emphasizes how information asymmetry and knowledge 
gaps can create temptations to give priority to self-interest over client 
interest. It is one thing to be transparent and open when the client has 
the resources critically to evaluate what you are doing, and quite another 
thing to be so when the client is wholly lacking in professional knowl-
edge. The pattern is present in private as well as public services, and is 
a pervasive feature whenever someone with a specialized and superior 
knowledge offers to look after less qualified people’s interests and needs. 
Some professions operate with more or less explicit pledges to the clients 
not to do exploit the knowledge gap. “Trust me; although my own self-
interest might dictate other actions, I undertake to serve in your best 
interest.” Doctors and lawyers are amongst the professions who have 
institutionalized pledges of this kind. In other professions, there is more 
of an implicit expectancy that the client gets what he or she needs, and 
that professional decisions are not dictated by the professional’s self-
interest.
Accountants are supposed to look after not only their clients’ inter-
est, but also the interest of other stakeholders who depend on correct 
financial information from the clients. In the Enron case, the account-
ants in Arthur Andersen assisted their client in hiding financial losses, 
by using mark-to-market accounting (Nanda, 2002i). By applying this 
accounting method, Enron could hide losses and appear to be a more 
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profitable company than it actually was (McLean and Elkin, 2003). In 
the aftermath of the collapse of both Enron and its accounting firm, new 
legislation forced the companies to implement stricter and more reliable 
accounting practices. What remains unchanged, however, is a system 
where accountants are supposed to control and be critical of financial 
information coming from clients who pay their fees to do so. The system 
can be likened to one where athletes pay their own doping controllers, 
and have the freedom to sack them and hire new ones if they are not 
satisfies with the service they get. In sports, a system of this kind would 
be unacceptable, since it would lead to doubt about the reliability and 
objectivity of the controls. The doping controllers would be under pres-
sure to look the other way when the athletes were preparing for competi-
tion, since they otherwise risked losing their jobs. With the principle 
of equality in hand, we can challenge the accountants to identify the 
morally relevant difference between their own relation to clients, and 
that of doping controllers’ relation to athletes under such a system. If 
the system is unacceptable in sports, it is equally so in finance, unless 
there is a morally relevant difference between them. I have yet to hear an 
adequate explanation of how accounting is different from the hypotheti-
cal sports system outlined here.
Ethics training with professionals and with students who are preparing 
to become professionals generally take the form of teaching them ways 
to analyse moral dilemmas. They become familiar with the Navigation 
Wheel and other tools to weight and consider the alternatives open to 
them in a moral dilemma. I contribute to such learning processes, and 
see the practical use of teaching the participants to think clearly about 
their options, in the light of ethical concepts and theories. However, the 
most challenging situations individual professionals or groups of profes-
sionals meet may not be ones where it is intellectually hard to identify the 
right choice. It may instead be situations where they have to recognize 
and deal with conflicts of interest, as when the client demands that an 
accountant accepts a dubious form of financial reporting, and threatens 
to go to another accountant if he does not get his way. These situations 
are not real moral dilemmas, since they do not constitute a choice 
between moral values that are more or less on equal footing. Instead, 
they are false dilemmas, temptations to do wrong rather than right.
The financial sector has been under scrutiny for dubious handlings of 
conflict of interest. To what extent can the client of a financial advisor 
expect to receive services that put his or her interests at the forefront? 
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Greg Smith added fuel to the criticism of the financial sector when he 
quit his job as an executive at the investment bank Goldman Sachs and 
published his resignation letter in the New York Times on March 14, 2012. 
Smith had been an employee at the bank for twelve years, and wrote that 
he had “always taken a lot of pride in advising my clients to do what I 
believe is right for them, even if it means less money for the firm.” It had 
gradually become more difficult for him to work in accordance with that 
principle, as the company culture became more toxic and destructive. In 
the published resignation letter he wrote:
I attend derivatives sales meetings where not one single minute is spent 
asking questions about how we can help clients. It’s purely about how we can 
make the most possible money off of them. If you were an alien from Mars 
and sat in on one of these meetings, you would believe that a client’s success 
or progress was not part of the thought process at all. It makes me ill how 
callously people talk about ripping their clients off.
Smith eventually released a book with his story of why he quit Goldman 
Sachs (Smith, 2012) and it generated renewed public skepticism about 
the handling of conflicts of interest in the financial sector. Smith’s own 
motivation for going public also came under critical light, as it appeared 
that he had recently been turned down for promotion and pay raise at the 
company. Former colleagues claimed that his criticism was unfounded, 
and that it merely was an expression of frustration over the slowness of 
his own career movements at the bank. It seemed that he would have 
been able to tolerate the alleged company culture of ripping off clients, if 
only his pay and position in the company had been high enough.1 Other 
commentators focused on Smith’s inside reports about cynical treatment 
of clients, especially those who were novices in the world of finance, and 
found them credible.
The crucial issue when it comes to conflict of interest, in finance 
and elsewhere, is incentives. My own impression based on a range of 
dialogues with financial advisors in Norway is that there is a tension 
between the official claim that client interests come first, and the practi-
cal incentives in the industry. Top management in the banks claim that 
things have improved after the financial crisis in 2008, and documenta-
tion of sales of dubious financial products to clients. Post-crisis, I have 
had sessions with financial advisors and asked them if they would ever 
advise someone to make a financial transaction that is best for him 
or her (the client), and only second best for the financial institution. 
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The question promotes hesitancy and reflection, and I try to be more 
concrete, by using the example from the first chapter in this book: A 
client has recently inherited 200,000 Euro from a relative, and comes for 
financial advice. The considered opinion of the financial advisor is that 
the smartest thing this person can do is to use the entire sum to reduce 
her debt. This option generates no income to the financial institution, 
and not personal bonus to the advisor. The pressure is on to get the client 
to buy a financial product and it is likely that the advice will be to do just 
that, particularly if the client is a financial novice and will be unable to 
evaluate the professional quality of the advice.
If top management in professional services organizations really want 
to signal that client interest comes first, they need to go over incentive 
systems in detail, and make sure they do not generate temptations to 
prioritize self-interest over client interest. They also need to demonstrate 
a willingness in concrete situations to forgo company and personal 
profits at the expense of what is best for the client. Another option in 
the financial sector is to change the label on the individuals who are 
in dialogue with clients about what they ought to do with their money 
from financial advisor to financial salesperson. That would make it clear 
to people who turn up to have a conversation about their economy that 
they cannot expect client-oriented behaviour from the person on the 
other side of the table, but instead a presentation of financial products 
that person has an interest in selling.
I have discussed conflict of interest with a range of professionals, 
amongst them dentists. In 2011, the Norwegian Consumer Council 
cooperated with the Faculty of Odontology at the University of Oslo to 
test the professional advice given by dentists in the Oslo area (Norwegian 
Consumer Council, 2001). Four patients first had their teeth analysed 
by professors of odontology, and then went to 20 different dentists (five 
each) to ask for analysis and a written recommendation for treatment. 
The results showed considerable differences in the treatment suggested 
by the dentists. Patients experienced pushy professionals, dentists who 
wanted to start treatment immediately, even if the problems were of the 
sort that according to the prior analysis should be treated at a later stage. 
Dentists failed to distinguish clearly between tooth issues that must, 
should and could be treated, three categories that the health authorities 
require dentists to operate with. One of the patients got recommenda-
tion from one dentist to nothing with her teeth, and recommenda-
tion for treatment costing 3000 Euro from another. Only three of the 
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twenty dentists passed the test of giving adequate recommendations for 
treatment.
In ethics sessions with dentists I have asked them to identify situations 
where conflict of interest can be a challenge for them (Kvalnes, 2015). 
One of them answered: “For someone who is good with the hammer, 
everything looks like a nail.” His point was that a dentist will prefer to 
use the method he or she prefers, rather than the method best suited to 
remedy the particular patient’s problem. Dentists in the private sector 
have economic incentives to change old fillings, and may suggest doing 
that even in situations where the best thing for the patient is to leave 
them as they are. Dentists in the public sector do not have incentives 
to over-treat their patients, but may instead have a personal interest in 
under treating a patient. The patient may be uncooperative and difficult, 
and the dentist can be tempted to say that there is nothing wrong with 
his or her teeth. Even in this profession, the knowledge gap creates situa-
tions where there is a discrepancy between the professional’s interest and 
the client’s interest, and the former can prioritize as he or she chooses, 
without being found out by the latter.
How can business schools and other educational institutions prepare 
students for conflict of interest situations? How can they create aware-
ness of the moral obligation to prioritize the client’s interest over self-
interest? Integrating ethics in professions in the curriculum can be one 
significant step, but may not be sufficient. Sumantra Ghoshal has argued 
that business schools need to revise radically the theories about human 
nature that students hear in the auditoriums (Ghoshal, 2005). He is 
critical of what he calls the basic assumption of mainstream economics, 
which is that human beings are self-interest maximizers. The teachers 
at business schools tell their students that a rational human being will 
analyse each situation in terms of “what’s in it for me?” and choose the 
option that they believe will serve their self-interest. Repeated mentions 
of the so-called Homo economicus assumption can make it come true:
If a theory assumes that the sun goes round the earth, it does not change 
what the sun actually does. So, if the theory is wrong, the truth is preserved 
for discovery by someone else. In contrast, a management theory – if it gains 
sufficient currency – changes the behaviours of managers who start acting in 
accordance with the theory. A theory that assumes that people can behave 
opportunistically and draws its conclusions for managing people from that 
assumption can induce managerial actions that are likely to enhance oppor-
tunistic behaviour among people. (Ghoshal, 2005, p. 77)
69Conflict of Interest
DOI: 10.1057/9781137532619.0011
Theories about human beings, then, can actually have an impact on the 
object of research. Empirical studies show that business school student 
do indeed tend to live and decide in accordance with the theory that 
human beings are self-interest maximizers (Ferraro et al., 2005; Gandal 
et al., 2005; Molinsky et al., 2012). The educational systems need to take 
this tendency seriously. Ghoshal argues convincingly that adding ethics 
courses to the curriculum is not sufficient, since faculty keeps the Homo 
economicus assumption alive in the standards courses in economics. His 
contribution sparked a debate about the effects of teaching and theory on 
business school students (Gapper, 2005; Hambrick, 2005; Kanter, 2005). 
Here we can add that students who learn that it is always rational to 
prioritize self-interest will be badly equipped to decide and act responsi-
bly in conflict of interest situations.
The behavioural psychologist Dan Ariely tells an interesting personal 
story about conflict of interest in a public talk on honesty (Ariely, 
2012ii). When I first saw a photograph of Ariely, I though there had 
to be something wrong with it, since his face looked odd, with blank 
skin on the right side of his face, and ordinary skin with beard stub-
bles on the left side. It turns out that Ariely was badly burnt in an 
accident many years ago. His story about conflict of interest is about 
what happens when he goes to the hospital to see a physician who has 
treated him over a long time. On this visit, the physician introduced 
him to a fantastic new treatment that he thought would be ideal for 
Ariely. It consisted in using technology to tattoo artificial stubbles on 
the blank parts of his facial skin, making him look more symmetrical. 
The physician showed him pictures of two patients who have taken the 
treatment already, and demonstrated the likeness between the real stub-
bles and the artificial ones. After careful consideration, Ariely decided 
not to go for this treatment. His answer provoked a shocking response 
from the physician, who verbally attacked him and tried to instil guilt 
in his patient. “What’s wrong with you? Do you get some pleasure from 
being asymmetrical? Do you enjoy looking different?” Ariely could not 
understand the fierceness of this response. He asked a hospital deputy 
about it, who explained that the physician was working on an academic 
paper about the treatment, and desperately needed a third patient to 
take it in order to make the paper publishable in a prestigious journal. 
That was his motivation for putting pressure on his asymmetrical 
patient. Ariely sees this as an example of how an excellent physician and 
a wonderful human being can become a prisoner of his own conflict of 
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interest, trying to coerce his patient into doing something that is good 
for physician and not for the patient.
A traditional approach to ethics in organizations is that people of weak 
moral character are the primary cause of misbehaviour in the workplace. 
In the category of moral culprits at work, we find the financial advisor 
who sells products to a client who would have been better off reducing 
her debt, the dentists who deliberately either over- or undertreat their 
patients, and the physician who tries to coerce a patient to tattoo stubble 
on his cheeks. One view, then, is that these people are morally deviant 
and weak, lacking the personal moral fibre to withstand temptations. 
In the next chapter we shall see that this character approach comes 
under pressure from experimental studies in social and moral psychol-
ogy, which indicate that circumstances have at least as much predictive 
power as character. The people who are guilty of wrongdoing at work 
can be ordinary leaders and employees, with ordinary moral standards 
and convictions. Experiments in this research stream gives us reasons 
to doubt that weak moral character is the most plausible explanation to 
moral misbehaviour in organizations. Rather, moral wrongdoing at work 
is something anyone can become involved in, if they are unfortunate with 
the circumstances they encounter, and the support, encouragement and 
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